I have argued that compatibilism cannot resist in a principled way the temptation to prepunish people, and that it thus emerges as a much more radical view than is typically presented and perceived; and is at odds with fundamental moral intuitions. Stephen Kearns has replied, and in the present paper I examine his arguments.

I argue that compatibilism cannot resist in a principled way the temptation to prepunish people. Compatibilism thus emerges as a much more radical view than it is typically presented and perceived, and is seen to be at odds with fundamental moral intuitions. The traditional compatibilist stance, according to which determinism does not really change anything, morally, is thereby 'shown' to be false.

In "The Paradox of Beneficial Retirement" I proposed a personal and moral paradox about integrity and retirement. This paradox raises the disturbing prospect that many people (perhaps even the majority, in many professions) ought to seriously consider retiring, because they are likely to be replaced by someone who will do their work better than they do it. In "Why I Have No Plans to Retire: In Defence of Moderate Professional Complacency", James Lenman argues that my argument does not succeed. I examine his arguments, and conclude that they do not significantly affect the salience of the paradox.

I made two claims against CE. First, that under careful analysis, CE compels us to bring about states of affairs so unacceptable that the position becomes absurd. By virtue of its very conceptual structure, CE gives us manifestly wrong instructions. Second, that CE?s hope of reconciling a strong egalitarianism with robust personal choice and something like the prevailing market economy is a chimera. Manor?s paper does not dispute my second claim. Indeed, his own claim, that in fact CE leads to something close to strict equality, supports my pessimism about CE?s reconciliation project. My reply to Manor therefore focuses on his denial of my ?rst claim, that choice-egalitarianism leads to absurdity.

Bad things often happen, and morally good people ought to be sorry that they happen. People are sometimes morally permitted not to do anything about such bad things, not to have to struggle to prevent them from occurring. But what could be more obvious to a good person than that one ought to be sorry about the occurrence of bad things? Even more so, it would seem, if the bad things occur in one?s vicinity, or one is involved with them. I shall argue that sometimes it is morally permissible not to be sorry when bad things happen. Perhaps it is even permissible to be happy about it

Morally, when should one retire from one's job? The surprising answer may be ''now''. It is commonly assumed that for a person who has acquired professional training at some personal effort, is employed in a task that society considers useful, and is working hard at it, no moral problem arises about whether that person should continue working. I argue that this may be a mistake: within many professions and pursuits, each one among the majority of those positive, productive, hard working people ought to consider leaving his or her job.

If the social environment were arranged so that most people in the West could, with relatively little effort, be morally good to a reasonable degree, would this be a good thing? I claim that it is not entirely obvious that we should say yes. This is no idle question: mainstream Western social morality today seems to be approaching the prospect for a morality that is not taxing. This question has substantial theoretical interest because exploring it will help us understand the paradoxical relationship between morality and moral worth.

In "Smilansky's Baseline Objection to Choice-Egalitarianism" (same issue of SATS), Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen challenged the "paradox of the baseline" I presented previously. I counter his two arguments, and conclude that his suggestions do not save choice-egalitarianism from the paradox. The egalitarian turn to choice and responsibility was indeed a huge boost to egalitarianism because it was thought to be compatible with other central values and fundamental intuitions. Choice-egalitarianism promised a "workable egalitarianism", but once we see how the deeper structure of this theory unfolds, we understand that these hopes are not realizable.

I examine the three most prominent examples of recent terrorism, and conclude that they lack any justification. In extreme instances where justification might be possible, there is no terrorism. I argue (1) that we need to confront the overwhelming force of mass illusions that lead to terrorism and its support; (2) that the belief, encouraged by the international laws of warfare, that terrorism is never justified, might be a "positive illusion"; and (3) of the dangers of the belief that we should permit terrorism in the fight by the weak against oppression.

Choice-egalitarianism (or CE) is, broadly, a version of egalitarianism that gives free choice a pivotal role in justifying any inequality. Choice-egalitarianism is a particularly attractive form of egalitarianism, for it ties in with the high value that many put on choice and responsibility. I argue that the very emphasis on choice leads to a paradox, which creates severe principled and pragmatic difficulties for choice-egalitarianism.

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